“One Man, One Dollar”?Examining the equalization argument in support ofcampaign contribution limits

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the second is that they democratize the financing of campaigns by equalizing the relative influenceof donors. According to the latter argument, an equalization of donor influence is desirablebecause it causes campaign resources to more accurately reflect public support for candidates andtheir political ideas. I construct a formal model to illustrate this equalization argument in support ofcontribution limits. The analysis calls attention to a number of implicit assumptions underlying thecorresponding money primary analogy for campaign fund-raising. The central assumption is that a candidate’s reliance on large contributions is an indicator of negative characteristics not revealedthrough her campaign communication. The model also suggests a method for testing this assumption,as it implies a negative relationship between a candidate’s reliance on large contributions andher electoral success. Using data on elections to the House of Representatives between 1990 and2002, I find no evidence that such a negative relationship exists. This empirical result casts doubton the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits.