Optimal At-Will Contracts.

In this paper a stylized labour contarct model is constructed where it is shown that when contracts are enforced by a specific performance rule, then above mentioned unfortunate features emerge. Thse features 'disappear' when the environment is amended by assuming that the court uses an at-will rule to enforce contracts.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Nosal, E.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Waterloo
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| ECONOMIC MODELS \| GAME THEORY \| LABOUR

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	25 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748028