Optimal auction design with deferred inspection and reward
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Alaei, Saeed ; Belloni, Alexandre ; Makhdoumi, Ali ; Malekian, Azarakhsh |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 72.2024, 6, p. 2413-2429
|
Subject: | Bayesian mechanism design | Border’s theorem | calculus of variations | deferred inspection | Market Analytics and Revenue Management | optimal auction design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Revenue-Management | Revenue management |
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