Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Monteiro, Paulo Klinger ; Page, Frank H. ; Svaiter, Benar fux
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 49.2013, 1, p. 106-110
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Optimal auctions \| Types exclusion \| Multidimensional types

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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