Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Roger, Guillaume |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 5.2013, 4, p. 55-80
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Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Theorie | Theory |
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