Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
Jaeyoung Sung
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Sung, Jaeyoung |
| Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 74.2022, 2, p. 593-642
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| Subject: | Managerial compensation | Mean-volatility ambiguity | Moral hazard | Optimal contract | Perception asymmetry | Stock option | Volatility control | Aktienoption | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Volatilität | Volatility | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risiko | Risk | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442066