Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

Jaeyoung Sung

Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Sung, Jaeyoung
Subject:	Managerial compensation \| Mean-volatility ambiguity \| Moral hazard \| Optimal contract \| Perception asymmetry \| Stock option \| Volatility control \| Aktienoption \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit \| Decision under uncertainty \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Volatilität \| Volatility \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Risiko \| Risk \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013442066