Optimal contracting with verifiable ex post signals

by Anke S. Kessler; Christoph Lülfesmann; Patrick Schmitz. Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Departments of Economics, University of Bonn

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Kessler, Anke S. ; Lülfesmann, Christoph ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Publisher:	Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Signalling \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory

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