Optimal contracts for central bankers
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Walsh, Carl E. |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 85.1995, 1, p. 150-165
|
Subject: | Zentralbank | Central bank | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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