Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Giebe, Thomas ; Gürtler, Oliver |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 81.2012, 2, p. 403-420
|
Subject: | Subjective performance evaluation | Leniency | Supervisor | Private information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal | Vertrag | Contract |
-
Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Giebe, Thomas, (2008)
-
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Gottlieb, Daniel, (2022)
-
Designing contracts for the global fund : lessons from the theory of incentives
Wren-Lewis, Liam, (2016)
- More ...
-
Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market
Bastani, Spencer, (2023)
-
Player strength and effort in contests
Giebe, Thomas, (2024)
-
Household specialization and competition for promotion
Bastani, Spencer, (2024)
- More ...