Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Dur, Robert A. J. ; Glazer, Amihai |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 24.2008, 1, p. 120-137
|
Subject: | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Neid | Envy | Theorie | Theory |
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