Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability.

In this paper we have developed a general model of borrowing constraints based on the idea of limited enforcement. I our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal borrowing and lending contract. Our model extends previous theories of borrowing and lending , such as Hart and Moore (1994) allowing for uncertainty and dynamic effects of the resulting credit constraints.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Albuquerque, R. ; Hopenhayn, H.A.
Institutions:	University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Subject:	BANKING \| ENTERPRISES \| INVESTMENTS

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Series:	RCER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200766