Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Wang, Ying ; Huang, Wenli ; Liu, Bo ; Zhang, Xiaohong |
Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 52.2020, p. 1-11
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Subject: | Time-inconsistent preferences | Principal-agent problem | Incentive effort | Retirement time | Consumption flow | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Intertemporale Entscheidung | Intertemporal choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Altersgrenze | Retirement | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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