Attention
Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Dur, Robert ; Glazer, Amihai |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Anreizvertrag | Agency Theory | Moral Hazard | Neid | principal-agent | envy | moral hazard | compensation | incentives | contracts | profitsharing | stock options | public vs. private production |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 1282 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 856905984 [GVK] hdl:10419/18920 [Handle] |
Classification: | M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc |
Source: |
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Dur, Robert A. J., (2004)
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J., (2006)
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
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