Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Englmaier, Florian ; Mühlheußer, Gerd ; Roider, Andreas |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 67.2014, p. 82-106
|
Subject: | Knowledge workers | Moral hazard | Limited commitment | Ex post outside option | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte | Highly skilled workers | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation |
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