Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns : theory and evidence
Year of publication: |
1991
|
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Authors: | Gibbons, Robert ; Murphy, Kevin James |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, MA |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Führungskräfte | Managers | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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