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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Robert Dur; Amihai Glazer
Year of publication:
2004
Authors: Dur, Robert A. J. ; Glazer, Amihai
Publisher: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Subject: Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Neid | Envy
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