Optimal incentives for salespeople with learning potential
Long Gao
| Year of publication: |
2023
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Gao, Long |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 69.2023, 6, p. 3285-3296
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| Subject: | agency theory | compensation | dynamic incentives | information asymmetry | learning | salesforce | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Verkaufspersonal | Salespeople | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lernprozess | Learning process | Anreiz | Incentives | Lernen | Learning | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4509 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305605