Optimal inflation targets, "conservative" central banks, and linear inflation contracts : comment

Roel M.W.J. Beetsma (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and CEPR), Henrik Jensen (University of Copenhagen and EPRU)

Recently, Svensson (1997) has shown that a combination of state-contingent inflation targeting and central banker conservatism produces optimal monetary policy if employment is persistent. We argue that the state-contingent nature of the scheme may undermine its credibility. We then show that the optimal policy in Svensson's model can nevertheless be attained through state-independent delegation.

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Year of publication:	1998 ; Final version: September 1998
Authors:	Beetsma, Roel ; Jensen, Henrik
Publisher:	Copenhagen, Denmark : Economic Policy Research Unit, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Subject:	Monetary policy \| state-independent delegation \| credibility problems \| output persistence \| Inflationssteuerung \| Inflation targeting \| Geldpolitisches Ziel \| Monetary target \| Glaubwürdigkeit \| Credibility \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
Series:	Working paper series / Economic Policy Research Unit, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. - Copenhagen : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2733585-9. - Vol. 1998, 11
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/82002 [Handle]
Classification:	E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537370