Optimal joint liability lending and with costly peer monitoring
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Carli, Francesco ; Uras, Burak |
Publisher: |
Tilburg : Center for Economic Research |
Subject: | Micro finance | Joint-liability | Group leader | Mikrofinanzierung | Microfinance | Theorie | Theory | Haftung | Liability | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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