Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents

In the paper we analyse a model for determining the optimal licensing contract in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. Next we present another way of solving the corresponding adverse selection model, using the informational rents as variables. This approach is different from that of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	MARINESCU, Daniela ; MARIN, Dumitru
Published in:	Theoretical and Applied Economics. - Asociaţia Generalā a Economiştilor din România - AGER. - Vol. XVIII(2011).2011, 6(559), p. 27-46
Publisher:	Asociaţia Generalā a Economiştilor din România - AGER
Subject:	optimal contract \| innovation \| adverse selection \| informational rents

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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