Optimal Mechanism Design With Approximate Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Many Players

We study a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism that allocates the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an ε-optimal mechanism for environments with many players

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Basu, Pathikrit
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives

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