Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Zhang, Jun ; Wang, Ruqu |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 5, p. 2096-2123
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Subject: | Auctions | Mechanism design | Resale | Bargaining power | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Verhandlungsmacht | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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