Optimal monetary policy and transparency under informational frictions
Year of publication: |
September 2016
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Authors: | Tamura, Wataru |
Published in: |
Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0022-2879, ZDB-ID 218362-6. - Vol. 48.2016, 6, p. 1293-1314
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Subject: | optimal monetary policy | disclosure policy | policy signaling | informational frictions | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Theorie | Theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Signalling | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure |
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