Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Peck, James ; Rampal, Jeevant |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 46.2021, 4, p. 1413-1429
|
Subject: | Bayesian incentive compatibility | correlated valuations | ex post individual rationality | monopoly mechanism | Monopol | Monopoly | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rationalität | Rationality | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
-
Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty : an example
Peck, James, (2019)
-
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
Manelli, Alejandro Marcelo, (2019)
-
An incentive-compatible and computationally efficient fog bargaining mechanism
Sim, Kwang Mong, (2023)
- More ...
-
Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty : an example
Peck, James, (2019)
-
Contests within and between groups
Bhattacharya, Puja, (2019)
-
Reverse Endowment Effect for a New Product
Banerji, A., (2020)
- More ...