Optimal nonlinear pricing with data-sensitive consumers
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
American economic journal. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7685, ZDB-ID 2452644-7. - Vol. 15.2023, 2, p. 80-108
|
Subject: | Belief | Communication | Consumer Economics: Theory, Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly, Asymmetric and Private Information | Information and Knowledge | Learning | Mechanism Design, Search | Monopolization Strategies | Unawareness, Monopoly | Monopol | Monopoly | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Konsumentenverhalten | Consumer behaviour | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Marktstruktur | Market structure | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Preisdifferenzierung | Price discrimination |
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