Optimal pollution standards and non-compliance in a dynamic framework
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
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Authors: | Arguedas, Carmen ; Cabo García, Francisco José ; Martín Herrán, Guiomar |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 68.2017, 3, p. 537-567
|
Subject: | Dynamic regulation | Stackelberg differential games | Non-compliance | Fines | Pollution standards | Umweltstandard | Environmental standard | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Regulierung | Regulation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Umweltbelastung | Pollution | Umweltökonomik | Environmental economics | Standardisierung | Standardization |
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