Optimal Privatization in a Mixed Duopoly with Consistent Conjectures

We show that partially privatizing a public firm alters underlying conjectures, in turn, changing the optimal degree of privatization. The consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) generates substantially greater optimal privatization than does any conjecture shared between the firms including the standard Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CNE). Yet, when the private rival is foreign, the CCE generates substantially less privatization than the CNE. The optimal extent of privatization with a domestic rival exceeds that with a foreign rival in the CCE as well as in the CNE

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Heywood, John S.
Other Persons:	Ye, Guangliang (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Privatisierung \| Privatization \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Öffentliches Unternehmen \| Public enterprise \| Privatwirtschaft \| Private sector
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]