Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive
Henry L. Friedman, John S. Hughes, Beatrice Michaeli
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Friedman, Henry L. ; Hughes, John S. ; Michaeli, Beatrice |
| Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 69.2020, 2/3, p. 1-22
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| Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Commitment | Discretionary disclosure | Mandatory disclosure | Verifiable messages | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Informationswert | Information value | Signalling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Berichtswesen | Reporting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101276 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237570