Optimal risk taking and information policy to avoid currency and liquidity crises
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Heinemann, Frank ; Bannier, Christina E. |
Publisher: |
Kassel : Univ. GhK, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |
Subject: | Währungskrise | Currency crisis | Währungsspekulation | Currency speculation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wechselkurspolitik | Exchange rate policy | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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