Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian A. ; Kaplow, Louis |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, MA |
Subject: | Strafe | Punishment | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Theorie | Theory |
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