Optimal service contract under cost information symmetry/asymmetry
Year of publication: |
February 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Li, Xiang ; Li, Yongjian |
Published in: |
Journal of the Operational Research Society : OR. - Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave, ISSN 0030-3623, ZDB-ID 716033-1. - Vol. 67.2016, 2, p. 269-279
|
Subject: | service outsourcing | service quality | incentive theory | optimal contract | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality | Outsourcing | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
-
Hoppe, Eva I., (2015)
-
Contract design by service providers with private effort
Zhang, Hao, (2018)
-
Quality of outsourced services, opportunism and contract design
Beuve, Jean, (2017)
- More ...
-
On green market segmentation under subsidy regulation
Li, Xiang, (2017)
-
A note on the random yield from the perspective of the supply chain
Li, Xiang, (2012)
-
Influencing factors of knowledge dissemination in rural areas in China
Li, Yongjian, (2015)
- More ...