Optimal transparency and risk-taking to avoid currency crises
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bannier, Christina E. ; Heinemann, Frank |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 161.2005, 3, p. 374-391
|
Subject: | Währungskrise | Currency crisis | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Theorie | Theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
Speculative attacks : unique sunspot equilibrium and transparency
Heinemann, Frank, (1999)
-
Speculative attacks : unique equilibrium and transparency
Heinemann, Frank, (2002)
-
Theory and practice of contagion in monetary unions : domino effects in EMU Mediterranean countries
Canofari, Paolo, (2014)
- More ...
-
Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises
Bannier, Christina E., (2005)
-
Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises
Bannier, Christina E., (2005)
-
Optimal risk taking and information policy to avoid currency and liquidity crises
Heinemann, Frank, (2002)
- More ...