Optimal unemployment insurance design : Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil |
Published in: |
International tax and public finance. - New York : Springer, ISSN 0927-5940, ZDB-ID 12074214. - Vol. 13.2006, 5, p. 565-585
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