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Optimal voting rules

Alex Gershkov; Benny Moldovanu; Xianwen Shi
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.
Year of publication:
2013
Authors: Gershkov, Alex ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Shi, Xianwen
Publisher: Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject: Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory
freely available
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