Ordinal simplicity and auditability in discrete mechanism design
Year of publication: |
31 March 2024
|
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Authors: | Pycia, Marek ; Ünver, M. Utku |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Ordinality | simplicity | strategy-proofness | auditability | non-bossiness | Paretoefficiency | welfare maximization | Arrovian efficiency | rich domains | public choice | house allo-cation | single-unit demand | multi-unit demand | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Nachfrage | Demand | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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