original papers : Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas

The allocation of heterogeneous and indivisible objects is considered where there is no medium of exchange. We characterize the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, Pareto-optimal, and neutral social choice functions when preferences are monotonic and quantity-monotonic. The characterized sets of social choice functions are sequential; agents are assigned their favorite objects among the objects not given to others before them, subject to a quota.

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Year of publication:	2000-04-18
Authors:	PÂpai, Szilvia
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 5.2000, 1, p. 91-105
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Strategyproof \| indivisible goods

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 5 January 1999 / Accepted: 14 June 1999
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596603