Other side of voluntary clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts : evidence from the investment efficiency
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Sohyung ; Lee, Cheol ; Mitra, Santanu |
Published in: |
Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies : RPBFMP. - Singapore : World Scientific, ZDB-ID 2033638-X. - Vol. 25.2022, 1, Art.-No. 2250001, p. 1-50
|
Subject: | Clawback provision | investment efficiency | management compensation | risk-taking behavior | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
-
The degradation of distorted performance measures
Sloof, Randolph, (2008)
-
Chen, Yu, (2014)
-
Clawback provision of SOX, financial misstatements, and CEO compensation contracts
Natarajan, Ramachandran, (2019)
- More ...
-
Goodwill accounting and asymmetric timeliness of earnings
Kim, Sohyung, (2013)
-
Implementability of trading strategies based on accounting information : Piotroski (2000) revisited
Kim, Sohyung, (2014)
-
Downes, Jimmy, (2018)
- More ...