Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Haake, Claus-Jochen ; Stroh-Maraun, Nadja |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 170.2018, p. 39-41
|
Subject: | Boston mechanism | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Manipulability | School choice | Top trading cycles | Schulauswahl | Matching | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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