Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Ludwig, Sandra ; Wichardt, Philipp C. ; Wickhorst, Hanke
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Arbeitsleistung \| Job performance \| Vertrauen \| Confidence \| Persönlichkeitspsychologie \| Personality psychology \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Wettbewerb \| Competition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 19, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1526519 [DOI]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199669