Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Merzoni, Guido ; Trombetta, Federico |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 135.2022, p. 132-143
|
Subject: | Asymmetric mismatch | Pandering | Political agency | Populism | Special interest groups | Theorie | Theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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