Pareto optimal anonymous mechanisms

Conan Mukherjee

Year of publication:	February 2023
Authors:	Mukherjee, Conan
Publisher:	Calcutta : Indian Institute of Management Calcutta
Subject:	indivisible object allocation \| mechanism design \| strategyproofness \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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