Partially verifiable information and mechanism design
Year of publication: |
1986
|
---|---|
Authors: | Green, Jerry R. |
Other Persons: | Laffont, Jean-Jacques (contributor) |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 53.1986, 3, p. 447-456
|
Subject: | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Organisation | Organization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
-
Partially verifiable information and mechanism design
Green, Jerry J., (1983)
-
Agency theory and uncertainty in organizations : an evaluation
Nilakant, V., (1994)
-
Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy
Kuhn, Michael, (2006)
- More ...
-
Renegotiation and the form of efficient contracts
Green, Jerry R., (1987)
-
Competition on many fronts : a Stackelberg signalling equilibrium
Green, Jerry R., (1986)
-
Contract renegotiation and the underinvestment effect
Green, Jerry R., (1988)
- More ...