PARTY FORMATION INCOLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
We study party formation in a general model of collective decisionmaking, modeling parties as agglomerations of policy positions championed by decision-makers. We show that if there are economies of party size and the policy chosen is not beaten by another policy in pairwise voting, then players agglomerate into exactly two parties. This result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals' preferences. Our analysis encompasses a wide range of models, including decision-making in committees with costly participation and representative democracy in which the legislature is elected by citizens.
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Osborne, Martin J. ; Tourky, Rabee |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
MARKETS THAT DON'T REPLICATE ANY OPTION
ALIPRANTIS, CHARALAMBOS D., (2002)
-
LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR PRICE DECENTRALIZATION
APLIPRANTIS, CHARALAMBOS D., (2003)
-
Party formation in single-issue politics
Osborne, Martin J., (2008)
- More ...