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Passing Your Gun to Your Enemy- Madness or Rationality? Rational Transfers in a Network of Contests

Transferring conflict-resources to an enemy is clearly irrational in a two- agent contest. But it might be possible (in equilibrium) in a network of contests. This paper proves that ex-ante conflict resource transfers to a direct opponent can happen in equilibrium, when there is a network of contests. The paper also proves the possibility of a portion of the transferred conflict resource getting employed against the transferer in equilibrium
Year of publication:
[2023]
Authors: Mishra, Ajit Kumar ; Bakshi, Dripto
Publisher: [S.l.] : SSRN
freely available
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Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Language: English
Other identifiers:
10.2139/ssrn.4462451 [DOI]
Source:
ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347705
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