Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control

We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental to consumers.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Jovanovic, Dragan ; Wey, Christian
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 32-35
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Horizontal mergers \| (Passive) Partial ownership \| Antitrust \| Synergies \| Sneaky takeovers

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; K21 - Antitrust Law ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939488