Patent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights

A patent fails to deliver public notice when it informs little about the patent boundary decision of the court. High quality of patent examination, i.e, less mistakes committed by the patent office, improves public notice. This paper provides a framework of evaluating the benefit of public notice to facilitate private investments, and how this information value is affected by strategic investments, market structure, and the accumulation of patent rights

Year of publication:	[2014]
Authors:	Chiou, Jing-Yuan
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Patent \| Patentrecht \| Patent law \| Theorie \| Theory

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