Problems noted with current patterns in patent litigation include the increasing cost of patent litigation, low incentives to invalidate weak patents because doing so could help competitors, and a high incentive to settle patent suits because of the high cost of bringing such cases to trial. The increasing importance of patents and the US Patent Office's ineffectiveness at screening out weak patents contribute to these issues. In European and commonwealth countries where the legal system adopts a loser pays rule, these countries have much less predatory litigation than in the United States, making the rule attractive to advocates of tort reform. The loser pays rule lessens the incentive to settle nuisance lawsuits just to avoid the high cost of litigation. In the long term, this could reduce the number of nuisance lawsuits as plaintiff's attorneys and repeat plaintiffs such as businesses gain experience with the new system. The scope of the benefits of adopting a loser pays rule however does have limits. The amount of time it takes to litigate a patent case could deter companies from defending patent claims, pushing them to settle. Opponents of loser pays worry it could unfairly benefit well-heeled litigants, although these concerns are misplaced given the current practice of targeting well-heeled litigants; insofar as the concerns are valid, can be addressed by other measures, including judicial limits on fees or insurance. As for concerns that the uncertainty of the legal system makes loser pays unfair, in actuality the legal uncertainty has been greatly exaggerated by academic focus on a few cases in the higher courts. Loser pays is the fairest rule as a general matter, because it alone leaves the party in the right wholly compensated after the lawsuit