Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information
This paper examines the strategic non-revelation of information by innovators when applying for patents. The lack of accessible prior art (i.e., an existing set of related inventions) may be responsible for the granting of questionable patents by examiners. In a model of a bilateral search of information we show that an innovator can conceal some information to increase the probability of being granted a patent, and the examiner makes her screening intensity contingent upon the level of prior art transmitted. We then analyze the effects of two policy changes: an existing one, called the Second Pair of Eyes Review, and another in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. Even though the implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy that involves equal screening intensity across all applications requires a limited commitment power from the examiner and induces truthful information transmission.
Year of publication: |
2007-01-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Langinier, Corinne ; Marcoul, Philippe |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Iowa State University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Contributory Infringement Rule and Patents
Langinier, Corinne, (2005)
-
Spatial Efficiency of Genetically Modified and Organic Crops
Ambec, Stefan, (2011)
-
Spatial Efficiency of Genetically Modified and Organic Crops
Ambec, Stefan, (2011)
- More ...