In a Small Fish War two agents interacting on a body of waterhave essentially two options: they can sh with restraint or without.Fishing with restraint is not harmful; shing without yields a higherimmediate catch, but may induce lower future catches.Inspired by recent work in biology, we introduce into this settingrarity value and Allee e¤ects. Rarity value means that extreme scarcityof the sh may a¤ect its unit pro t explosively. An Allee e¤ect im-plies that if the population size or density falls below a so-called Alleethreshold, then only negative growth rates can occur from then on.We examine equilibrium behavior of the agents under the limitingaverage reward criterion and the sustainability of the common-poolresource system. Assuming xed prices at rst, we show that patienceon the part of the agents is bene cial to both sustainable high catchesand sh stocks. An Allee e¤ect can not inuence the set of equilibriumrewards unless the Allee threshold is (unrealistically) high.A price mechanism reecting e¤ects of the resources scarcity, isthen imposed. We obtain a rather subtle picture of what may occur.Patience may be detrimental to the sustainability of a high sh stockand it may be compatible with equilibrium behavior to exhaust theresource almost completely. However, this result does not hold in gen-eral but it depends on complex relations between the Allee threshold,the dynamics in the (interactive) resource and price systems, and theactual scarcity caused if the agents show no restraint.Keywords: common pool resource systems, sh wars, limiting averagerewards, sustainability, rarity value, Allee e¤ect, stochastic games..