Performance target revisions in incentive contracts : do information and trust reduce ratcheting and the ratchet effect?
Jasmijn C. Bol; Jeremy B. Lill
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Bol, Jasmijn C. ; Lill, Jeremy B. |
| Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 90.2015, 5, p. 1755-1778
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| Subject: | performance targets | ratcheting | the ratchet effect | peer performance | environmental volatility | trust | compensation contracts | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrauen | Confidence | Theorie | Theory | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Einkommenshypothese | Income hypothesis | Volatilität | Volatility |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011375818